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On the limits of cultural relativism as a debiasing method 
David Teira | UNED 
I analyse cultural relativism as a methodological strategy to correct for ethnocentric 
biases in anthropological fieldwork. I discuss the format debiasing norms may adopt 
(rules or standards) depending on whether a discipline has a causal or interpretative 
outlook. Boas and his school advocated for an interpretative approach to ethnographic 
fieldwork, in which cultural relativism was implemented as a standard (“Only 
culturally unbiased reports are admissible”) to be interpreted by expert third parties. 
Legitimate as it may be as a debiasing method, it does not allow anthropologists to 
adjudicate their debates on biases in their ethnographic record.  
  
2 
 
1. Cultural Relativism as a Debiasing Procedure 
Philosophers of science have extensively debated cultural relativism for already more 
than half a century (Koskinen 2019). The consensual view is that it is only legitimate as a 
method to control for ethnocentrism in anthropological fieldwork, and objectionable in every 
other respect (e.g., about human rights). For gathering data in the field, anthropologists 
usually rely on participant observation, taking active part in the ways of life under study 
while keeping a record of what goes on. The methodological challenge of participant 
observation is that there is no pre-established study protocol with closed research questions 
and data-collection procedures: the questions addressed and the necessary data are usually 
articulated throughout the observation process (Zahle 2013).  
In this context, cultural relativism is a prescription for the anthropologist to suspend 
her own judgments in order to prevent the contamination of her fieldwork records with her 
native culture’s values. From a methodological standpoint, ethnocentrism would be a 
potential bias for the anthropologist and cultural relativism the debiasing device that should 
control for it. I am going to argue that cultural relativism is a legitimate but ineffective bias 
correction, as endless controversies among anthropologists illustrate. More precisely, cultural 
relativism is a methodological prescription articulated in a way that makes impossible to 
adjudicate whether the data are actually biased and in which way they should be corrected.  
I will discuss first, in the following section, how the cognitive bias of the research 
participants interferes in the data gathering process, and how researchers in different scientific 
fields have learnt to control for these biases with several rules of thumb. Drawing on an 
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established distinction among legal philosophers, I will argue next that these rules of thumb 
can be rendered into methodological prescriptions with two different formats: rules and 
standards. If biases are understood as causal interferences in the data gathering process, 
debiasing norms are better articulated as rules –norms of the conditional form if X, then Y.  
Interpretative methods, like participant observation in anthropology, do not fit well with a 
causal understanding of biases, and debiasing norms are instead articulated as standards –
general prescriptions that experts should interpret on a case by case basis. 
In section 3, I will discuss how cultural relativism emerged within a non-causal 
approach to anthropological fieldwork inaugurated by Franz Boas and his school. They 
established it as a professional norm among anthropologists with a view to fighting 
ethnocentrism, articulating it as a standard of the form “Only culturally unbiased reports are 
admissible”. Despite the institutional success of this norm (widely endorsed by the major 
scholarly societies in the field), anthropologists have not agreed so far on how to interpret it in 
order to adjudicate conflicts about biased evidence. In section 4, I will discuss several debates 
on ethnocentrism in a leading anthropology journal to show cultural relativism is a completely 
ineffective methodological norm when it comes to close a controversy. In the fifth and final 
section, I will discuss why, despite its lack of effectiveness, cultural relativism may not hinder 
the progress of anthropology. On the one hand, it may work better as a guideline for correct 
reporting than an actual debiasing method. On the other hand, since most anthropologists do 
not aggregate evidence to ground far-reaching theories, they may not need to standardize their 
controls for bias (as it happens in other scientific fields). 
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2. Biases: Causes or Misinterpretations 
Let me informally introduce the concept of cognitive bias. When we speak of an 
unbiased estimator in statistics, we refer to the difference between this estimator’s expected 
value and the true value of the parameter being estimated. If we are interested in the latter, we 
want this difference to be zero. The problem with most sources of evidence is that we do not 
know the true value of the variable under investigation: the evidence collected should yield 
our best approximation. However, if there is some systematic interference in the data 
collection process, we will say that the evidence is biased and will not ground sound 
inferences about the truths under investigation. How can we know, without begging the 
principle, that there is a bias without knowing the true value? 
Psychologists have documented a general tendency to incur all sorts of unintentional 
biases in our dealings with empirical data. Knowing the true value a given cognitive process 
should yield, psychologists have constructed many experimental setups in which subjects, 
unaware of the true value, try to reach it drawing on the available evidence. One particularly 
interesting instance is our general selectivity in the treatment of evidence: we tend to handle 
data in a way that, for instance, does not give equal weight to evidence favourable and 
unfavourable for our preferences. This is called the confirmation bias and it is a solid 
experimental regularity. Different psychological mechanisms have been hypothesized in order 
to account for confirmation biases (Weber and Johnson 2009):  e.g., affective influences on 
cognitive operations on beliefs; limitations of our information-processing capacities; conflicts 
between conscious and unconscious information-processing mechanisms, etc.  However, like 
with most other biases, there is no agreement on the on the explanatory mechanism for the 
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confirmation bias. And, consequently, there is nothing like a consensual unified theory about 
cognitive biases. What psychologists have is a catalogue of experiments on biases probing 
different cognitive resources (e.g., attention, encoding and evaluation of data, memory). In 
these experiments, biases emerge regularly as systematic deviations from a benchmark value. 
From the standpoint of psychology, biases are thus solid experimental regularities.  
Scientists suffer from cognitive biases when they gather evidence, developing 
methodological checks to correct them (Fugelsang et al. 2004). Experimentalists in different 
fields have detected practices that yield systematic deviations from what turns out to be the 
true value. By trial and error, they have also found methods for the correction of such biases 
in their data gathering processes. Think for instance of blinding: masking treatments in an 
experiment so that the participants cannot ascertain which one they are giving or receiving. 
Inquisitors apparently used blinding in witchcraft trials, but it was Lavoisier who 
systematized it as an experimental control at the end of the 18th century. Lavoisier was part of 
a committee testing the therapeutic efficacy of animal magnetism, a controversial intervention 
advocated by the German physician Franz Anton Mesmer. Lavoisier suggested to blind 
patients in order to separate the reactions caused by magnetism itself from those elicited by 
the therapist through other means. Lavoisier, like the inquisitors before him, did not have a 
theory to account for the cognitive mechanisms that blinding defused. They just tried it and 
saw that blinding showed that patients did not react to animal magnetism if they did not know 
they were receiving it. 
In a separate paper (Teira 2016) I have discussed under which conditions these rules of 
thumb become justified methodological norms: debiasing methods warrant the neutrality of 
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the experiment regarding an agreed list of potential interferences (such as the preferences of 
the participants). My claim is now that depending on how cognitive biases are understood in a 
discipline, the debiasing rules of thumb will yield methodological norms of at least two kinds: 
rules and standards. This is a legal distinction that goes as follows (Luppi and Parisi 2011). 
Rules are norms that can be rendered into conditionals of the form if X, then Y: “Dogs are not 
allowed in the bar” can be paraphrased as “If X is a dog, then X is not allowed in the bar”. 
Standards are instead norms open to interpretation: “Only good dogs are allowed in the bar” 
requires that somebody assess the character of the dog, before letting it in. 
I contend that if cognitive biases are understood as causal interferences in the data 
gathering process, the debiasing norms will be better articulated as rules. In experimental 
fields such as physics or medicine, biases are usually understood as uncontrolled causal 
factors with an influence in the intervention under study (Staley 2004; Chalmers 2006). The 
understanding of causality may be rough. In medicine, the causes of disease or the statistical 
analysis of causation about 150 years old now. Yet, for centuries, medical researchers have 
shared a rough grasp of the differences made by the various elements in a treatment and, in 
particular, by the preferences of the physicians and patients. These preferences introduce 
cognitive biases when testing treatments: as we already saw, blinding emerged to control for 
the patients’ preferences and make sure that they had no role in the ascertainment of the 
treatment effect. Randomization was introduced in the 18th century as a simple correction for 
the selection bias introduced by physicians who allocated treatments depending on the 
characteristics of the patients. Debiasing methods warrant a fair test, facilitating a like with 
7 
 
like comparison between treatments in which the preferences of any participant play no role 
in the data generation process. 
If cognitive biases are understood as causal confounders, debiasing methods will better 
adopt the format of a conditional rule: if, at any given stage in the experiment, there is a 
potential risk of bias, the relevant correction should be implemented. E.g., if there is a risk of 
a physician allocating treatments according to her preferences, randomize; if there is a risk of 
a patient reacting to a treatment according to his preferences, blind the treatment. Why a rule 
better than a standard? The economic analysis of law has shown that, under certain 
assumptions, rules are more effective than standards in order to prevent conflicts of interest 
(Fon and Parisi 2007). Standards require interpretation and are therefore open to self-serving 
implementations; rules are comparatively automatic: if the antecedent condition occurs, a 
definite action should be triggered. 
However, if biases in the data gathering process are not understood in causal terms, 
standards may provide an easier rendition. This is the case of the interpretative social 
sciences, where instead of searching for causal regularities, research aims at capturing 
singular phenomena in mostly qualitative terms. The biases interfering in the data gathering 
process are here understood as distortions in the interpretative process: e.g., researchers 
misinterpreting the data due to their own prejudices. As we are going to discuss next, 
ethnocentrism in anthropology is perhaps the most prominent example of this understanding 
of bias. For this sort of cognitive bias, there is no obvious hard trigger, since research is not 
understood causally: the distortion is usually perceived by a competent third party. Therefore, 
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the debiasing methods are better rendered as standards to be interpreted by an expert, as we 
are going to illustrate next with cultural relativism. 
3. Cultural Relativism as a Debiasing Standard 
Historically, there have been many different rules of thumb warning about the 
different cultural perspectives in a report –e.g., Xenophanes (570-480BC) warned about 
different people attribute their own characteristics to their gods. However, the transformation 
of these rules of thumb into a methodological norm came only with the institutional rise of 
anthropology as a scientific field, a process that took place mainly in the US during the first 
half of the 20th century. Franz Boas, the leading advocate for cultural relativism, was also one 
of the founding fathers of the discipline, contributing through his students to establish many 
graduate programs in the US. In these programs, cultural relativism became one of the 
defining traits of the profession. 
Franz Boas systematized this rule of thumb as a professional standard throughout his 
life-long debate against a hierarchical view of cultures, typical of so many 19th century 
anthropologists (Hatch 1983). Drawing on extensive ethnographic evidence, Boas used 
human variability to argue against any causal inferences in anthropology and, in particular, 
against those who ranked biological or cultural traits in terms their purported superiority. 
Underlying the hierarchy there would be a causal genealogy, in which the simpler forms 
would precede and bring about the more complex. For Boas, instead, there were neither laws 
in culture nor unambiguous categories capturing different instantiations of a given 
phenomenon in different cultural setups. There would not be either statistical tool powerful 
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enough to decompose human variability into specific causal factors with separate 
contributions to either biological or cultural phenomena (Boas [1936] 1940, 309). According 
to Boas, whatever general structures there could be in a given culture, the individuals 
operating from within constantly transform them. Even external interventions alter the 
phenomena under study. For Boas, this is why the ideal of experimental control could not be 
achieved when dealing with cultural phenomena (Boas [1932] 1940, 256) The anthropologist 
should rely instead on participant observation: spend time in a culture and create an extensive 
record of its different practices, trying to capture what’s specific to them.  
In this context, Boas warned against those anthropological analyses that imposed their 
own cultural categories on their topic. He wanted “freedom from cultural prejudice”. Boas’ 
disciples dubbed this prejudice ethnocentrism, “the point of view that one’s way of life is to 
be preferred to all others” (Herskotvits [1955] 1973). Boas gave no methodological recipe for 
the correction of this prejudice, other than “the intensive study of foreign cultures of 
fundamentally distinctive types” (Boas and Benedict 1938, 685).  For Boas and his school, 
extended fieldwork, thorough learning of the local language, detailed notes written up daily 
while in the field, and the prohibition on premature or uncritical generalizations seemed to be 
the natural remedy for ethnocentrism. 
The Boasian school systematized this general warning against prejudice into cultural 
relativism. Perhaps the most popular formulation is Melville Herskovits’: “Judgments are 
based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own 
enculturation.” (Herskotvits [1955] 1973, 15). Like Boas, Herskovits never discussed the 
psychological mechanisms triggering ethnocentrism, but he also praised culturally immersive 
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fieldwork seemed as the best correction for ethnocentrism (Herskotvits [1960] 1973, 246).  It 
was necessary to engage with the subjects under study until the anthropologist could grasp 
individuality beyond any stereotype.  
Unlike in those experimental fields in which data are gathered through controlled 
interventions, the Boasians relied instead on participant observation. For them, biases could 
not be causal confounders, but rather interpretative prejudices. Rather than targeting any 
particular cognitive mechanism triggering them, they opted for warnings in the form of a 
standard like: “Only culturally unbiased reports are admissible” –or, using Herskovits’ own 
terms: “Accept only reports without judgments based on the experience of the 
anthropologist’s own enculturation”. Third party experts would ultimately decide on whether 
the resulting ethnography had any trace of the author’s cultural prejudices. Ethnocentrism, 
after all, would be a cultural phenomenon for which there would be no single causal structure 
to correct and detecting it is equally a matter of interpretation.  
The success of this norm among US anthropologist was due mostly to the pre-
eminence of Boas and his school in articulating and staffing the first graduate programmes in 
the country. Historians of the social sciences have sometimes argued that this professional 
aspiration to a bias-free discipline was a rhetorical device: scientist vindicated their 
impartiality to better advise the policy-makers. Instead, thanks to their fight against 
ethnocentrism, Boasian anthropologists became a leading critical voice on US foreign policy, 
so it is difficult to find any professional self-serving interest in cultural relativism. What we 
find instead among US anthropologists is an incensed disciplinary debate on the existence of a 
hierarchy of racial and cultural traits. The presentation of ethnographic evidence contaminated 
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with ethnocentric biases provided, for the Boasians, a biased confirmation of such hierarchies. 
In order to settle the debate, it was necessary to agree on what counted as unprejudiced 
evidence for the profession. Whereas debiasing rules successfully settled these debates on the 
neutrality data in experimental fields, I want to defend next that if cultural relativism ever 
contributed to the professional consensus of anthropologists, it was never because they agreed 
on how to use it as a debiasing standard. 
4. What Counts as Unbiased Anthropological Data? 
Debiasing rules (of the form “If X, then Y”) anticipate all those point in the data 
gathering process in which a bias may interfere and prescribe a definite action to prevent it. 
Methodological standards of the form “Only culturally unbiased reports are admissible” are 
open to interpretation: what counts as a bias and who should decide whether it is affecting the 
report? The problem is, of course, that there is no single source of authority among 
anthropologists to decide whether the standard has been breached. In fact, anthropologists 
have been debating for decades how to balance the authority of the different informants 
within a group. Should they be the oldest non-Westernized members of a group? (Herskotvits 
[1958] 1973, 88) himself suggested instead to “observe a wide range of persons in as many 
situations as possible”, independently of age, gender, etc. Methodologists of participant 
observation recommended relying not just on informants, but also on anthropological theory, 
introspective examination, etc. However, these recommendations rarely disambiguate the 
standard of cultural relativism precisely enough to establish whether it has actually been 
breached. In other words, formulated as a standard, cultural relativism does not allow 
anthropologists to reach a consensus on the quality of an actual dataset.  
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In order to make my case, I have explored the 329 mentions of the keyword 
ethnocentrism featuring in the JSTOR collection of the American Anthropologist, the journal 
of the American Anthropological Association. I have focused on accusation of bias raised 
against particular papers and the exchanges that followed in the commentaries section. The 
number of these exchanges is low, as one may expect from a scholarly journal in which 
editors and reviewers should have screened off the grossest forms of ethnocentrism. Yet, the 
remaining controversies illustrate my point that invoking the universal agreement on the 
standard of cultural relativism does not help much in deciding whether it has been breached. I 
will provide just a couple of examples. 
(Balzer 1981) presents a theory about the rituals of gender identity among the Siberian 
Khanty within a general discussion of religious syncretism. (Child and Child 1985) challenge 
the concept of female pollution in Balzer’s theory, since it would present a negative view of 
menstruation that is not supported by “the material she presents” and would reveal instead a 
projection of Balzer’s own cultural values. Balzer’s response is that this negative view is 
present among Khanty women, as documented by practices (e.g., female exclusion to 
menstrual huts) and semantic analyses of Khanty vocabulary on menstruation. Other 
ethnographies would confirm her interpretation. (Balzer 1981) also warns that anthropologist 
should not fall into “reverse ethnocentrism traps” by wishing that menstruation were viewed 
more positively in other cultures than in the anthropologist’s own. In other words, (Child and 
Child 1985) would challenge the use of a negatively connoted Western theoretical concept 
(pollution) on Khanty material. (Balzer 1981) defends this use as appropriate given the 
negative connotation menstruation has among the Khanty. In other words, for Balzer one 
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abides by cultural relativism to the extent that there is a match between the negative values in 
the source and the target culture. Seeking any mismatch (via positive connotations) would 
reveal instead, for Balzer, an ethnocentric slip. Who is interpreting the standard correctly 
here? 
(Foin and Davis 1987) use data from Maring ethnographies to test formal models of 
human population dynamics. (LiPuma 1988) accuses them of ethnocentrism for 
understanding Maring social practices in terms of their own “Western materialistic ideology”, 
since (Foin and Davis 1987) would explain emigration by causal factors (number of pigs) that 
are not reflected on Maring “cultural concepts and practices” on emigration. (Davis and Foin 
1988) reply makes explicit that they are just formalizing other anthropologists’ work without 
assessing their assumptions. Yet, they suspect, LiPuma’s objection are not about the details of 
their model, but rather about mathematical modelling in anthropology. In my own words, 
imposing (Western) causal structures on (non-Western) holistic webs of practices would 
count, for LiPuma, as a breach of cultural relativism. For Davis and Foin, this is just a 
methodological disagreement on explanation. Again, it is far from clear who is interpreting 
the standard correctly here. 
These two examples illustrate very abstract forms of (purported) ethnocentrism, where 
the cultural prejudice lies in a particular theoretical standpoint. All the involved parties 
adhered to the standard of cultural relativism, but this shared commitment does very little to 
close the conflict, precisely because there was no agreement about what counted as bias. Both 
parties can see each other as biased by different parts of their own culture, triggering debates 
that are impossible to close on the basis of the cultural relativism standard alone since there is 
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no consensual authority to adjudicate it. If cultural relativism was born in the context of a 
debate on the purported superiority of some cultural forms, we may conclude that, on its own, 
it did very little to close it.  
5. Concluding Remarks: Why Not Rules Instead? 
I have argued that cognitive biases are controlled with methodological norms of, at 
least, two formats: rules and standards. In experimental disciplines with a causal approach, 
debiasing rules seem easier to formulate and implement, because they target the particular 
points in the data gathering process in which bias may emerge, prescribing definite actions to 
control for them. In non-causal forms of research, like participant observation in 
anthropology, cognitive biases appear as interpretative slips, for which there are no fixed ex 
ante corrections. Methodological norms like cultural relativism are formulated as standards 
instead, creating the problem of adjudicating them for particular pieces of evidence. As we 
just saw in the previous section, anthropologists do not seem to agree on how to carry out this 
adjudication process, whereas rule-based experimental fields exhibit, prima facie, a 
substantive consensus on biases and debiasing methods. In pharmacology, a field fraught with 
financial conflicts of interest professional bodies like the Cochrane collaboration have 
produced reference lists of biases and debiasing methods to score the quality of trial evidence 
that are regarded as a benchmark and elicit a broad professional consensus as to what counts 
as good trial evidence (Sterne et al. 2019). Instead, the American Anthropological 
Association, perhaps still faithful to Boas, has just generically promoted cultural relativism, 
without any guideline about how to detect it and correct it.  
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We may finally wonder why it is that this lack of consensus on ethnocentrism does not 
apparently hinder research in anthropology. In my view, there are two complementary 
reasons. On the one hand, cultural relativism may be a simple guideline for reporting, more 
than an actual correction for any bias. On the other hand, in as long as anthropologists do not 
build up generalizations, they do not need to rely on each other’s reports, aggregating their 
evidence. 
Cultural relativism maybe just a guideline in the process of generating ethnographic 
evidence: it is about not expressing dismay whenever confronted by practices that struck the 
anthropologist as illogical or repugnant (Brown, xa, and F 2008, 367). However, the 
anthropologist may entertain such thoughts in private, provided they are not included in the 
field notes ore the published report. A notorious case in point was Bronislaw Malinowski 
whose private records about his experience with the Trobrianders are significantly more 
ethnocentric than his famous monograph (Malinowski 1989). Nonetheless, the latter were 
considered for decades masterpieces of fieldwork. However, even as reporting guideline, 
cultural relativism may be challenged. Colin Turnbull famously lost his “anthropological 
cool” during his time with the Ik, a severely deprived culture in Uganda in which there was 
very little cooperation among its members in order to avoid any sharing of their scarce 
resources. Turnbull not only reported his shock in print, but recommended that the Ik were 
disbanded and its members incorporated into more socially cohesive cultures (Turnbull 1972). 
For many anthropologists, Turnbull was guilty of breaching cultural relativism, contaminating 
his report with his own value judgments (Wilson et al. 1975). But Turnbull defended his 
report arguing that the anthropologist “should present his involvement as part of the data”, so 
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the reader can assess the involvement itself “as data” and discount it like any other 
characteristic of the ethnographer (Wilson et al. 1975, 356). Perhaps the lack of professional 
consensus as to what counts as ethnocentrism is not a problem because each individual 
anthropologist can read this way other colleague’s work. I.e. discounting what in her own 
definition counts as biased in a report and building up on whatever else is left. 
This should not be a problem to the extent that anthropologists can dispense with 
consensual forms of evidence aggregation. Again, the comparison with pharmacology is 
useful: having a standardized score of the risk of bias in a clinical trial (depending on whether 
it is randomized, blinded, etc.) is crucial for aggregating evidence from different trials into 
meta-analyses. Here, the risk of bias in a dataset can be transformed into a numerical weight 
that will ponder the influence of each single trial in the aggregated conclusions about 
treatment effects. Anthropology has instead evolved into more and more extreme forms of 
particularism (Jarvie 1993): each ethnography reports about the events a particular 
anthropologist witnessed without any pretence of generality as to what happened before (or 
will happen after) the fieldwork. For some, an ethnocentric ethnography may be a case of 
professional misconduct, but no data point is not lost for further analysis. If at any point, there 
is a paradigm shift in anthropology such that generalization and comparison become 
acceptable again, it will be probably be useful to transform the current standard against 
ethnocentrism into a set of debiasing rules capable of adjudicating debates. After all, several 
rules of thumb seem to be already at work among practitioners (length of the field visit, 
command of the language, systematicity of the field notes, etc.). Transforming these informal 
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prescriptions into formalized debiasing rules, conventional as they may be, will be more 
effective at controlling for cognitive biases than the current standard on cultural relativism.  
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